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Take-ings 
WILLIAM MICHAEL TREANOR* 
The word property had many meanings in 1789, as it does today, and 
a critical aspect of the ongoing debate about the meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment's Takings Clause has centered on how the word should be 
read in the context of the Clause. Property has been read by Professor 
Thomas Merrill to refer to "ownership" interests, 1 by Richard Epstein in 
terms of a broad Blackstonian conception of the individual control of the 
possession, use, and disposition of resources, 2 by Benjamin Barros as 
reflective of constructions through individual expectations and state 
law,3 and by me as physical control of material possessions.4 
As a textual matter, however, the Takings Clause is not simply 
concerned with governmental actions that affect property. The Clause 
provides that "private proiJerty [shall not] be taken for public use 
without just compensation."5 It is thus concerned with "property taken 
for public use" and the word taken is the key, at least for a textualist, to 
* Dean and Paul Fuller Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I 
thank Kate McLeod and Todd Melnick for superb research assistance. I also thank Larry 
Alexander for inviting me to participate in this extraordinary conference and to my 
fellow participants, whose comments substantially improved this essay. Finally, it was a 
privilege to be part of a conference honoring the memory of Bernard Siegan, a pathbreaking 
scholar whose insights have powerfully shaped and influenced current debate about 
constitutional protections of private property. 
1. Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REv. 
885, 893 (2000). 
2. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN 22-23 ( 1985). 
3. D. Benjamin Barros, Defining "Property" in the Just Compensation Clause, 
63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1853, 1854 (1995). 
4. William Michael Treanor, The Originai Understanding of the Takings Ciause 
and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 782, 782 ( 1995). 
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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understanding both which types of governmental actions fall within the 
ambit of the Clause and what types of property the Clause protects. The 
centrality of the concept of takings to the Clause's meaning is reflected 
by the name by which the Clause is known. It is the "Takings Clause," 
not the "Property Clause."6 Although it has, ironically, not figured 
prominently in "takings" scholarship, the word taken is of fundamental 
importance to the Clause's meaning. In this essay, I will explore that 
importance from a textualist perspective and argue that a textualist will 
reject the doctrine of regulatory takings. 
In modern usage, to take is, most commonly, a physical act. The 
Webster's Dictionary that I keep on my desk, for example, begins its 
entry on take and its derivatives, took, taken, taking, takes as follows: 
"1. To get into one's possession by force, skill, or artifice, ... 2. To grasp 
with the hands .... " If I tell my daughter Katherine that she cannot play 
ball in the apartment, she will not be happy with me, but she will not 
accuse me of having "taken" her bail--or, for that matter, of having 
"taken" anything at all, such as a usage right she previously possessed in 
her ball. I have not gotten possession of it; I am not grasping it with my 
hands. 
There are, of course, usages of take that do not involve physical seizure. 
One can take issue with something, or take turns, or take something for 
granted, or take heart. But none of the various meanings of take that do 
not involve physical possession or something similar intelligibly links 
with the word property. As a result, for a textualist who interprets 
constitutional text in accordance with modern usage--what I will call a 
modern usage textualist-the Takings Clause simply does not implicate 
regulations that affect the value of property.8 The Clause is only about 
government acts of seizure--classic acts of eminent domain. There is, 
obviously, a dramatic gap between the case law and the reading that a 
textualist of this stripe should embrace: the Supreme Court has embraced 
the doctrine of regulatory takings for well over one hundred years. 9 
6. It is sometimes called the Just Compensation Clause, but Takings Clause is far 
more common. A search conducted on November 10, 2007 in the LEXIS database of 
articles published in 2007 indicates that 196 use the phrase Takings Clause, while only 
24 use the phrase Just Compensation Clause. 
7. WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1150 (3d ed. 2005). 
8. In his book Constitutional Fate, Philip Bobbitt argues that Justice Hugo 
Black's textualism reflected this approach. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: 
THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 31 ( 1982). 
9. See Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 413 (1894). While 
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), is often thought to be the first regulatory 
takings case, the doctrine of regulatory takings emerged in the Supreme Court case law 
in Reagan and in the ensuing years became well established as the Court reviewed 
government regulations of "businesses 'affected with a public interest."' For discussion, 
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Nonetheless, a modem usage textualist should reject regulatory takings 
as an oxymoron because regulation is not a particular kind of taking of 
property. 
This point is illustrated by looking at the definition of a taking of 
property offered by Professor Richard Epstein, a textualist and the 
leading champion of a broad conception of regulatory takings-although 
one who looks to original meaning rather than modem meaning to define 
text. Epstein has defined a taking of property as "[a]ny diminution of 
rights in the bundle of any holder, no matter what becomes of those 
rights." 10 While the conception ofproperty as rights in the bundle of any 
holder reflects a standard usage, diminution does not reflect a meaning 
of take. JI 
There are not many modem usage textualists today, but textualists 
who seek to recover the original meaning of the text are one of today's 
dominant schools of constitutional interpretation, a school of thought 
championed by both Justices Scalia and Thomas, as well as leading 
academics.12 I will call this school of thought "original meaning textualism." 
Justice Scalia has simply and precisely captured this school's approach 
to constitutional interpretation: "What I look for in the Constitution is 
see William Michael Treanor, Jam for Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of 
Mahon, 86 GEO. L.J. 813, 836-39 (1998). 
10. Richard A. Epstein, The Next Generation of Legal Scholarship?, 30 STAN. L. 
REv. 635, 640 (1978) (book review). 
11. For further development of my critique of Epstein's reading of the Takings 
Clause on textualist grounds, see William Michael Treanor, Translation Without Fidelity: A 
Response to Richard Epstein's Fidelity Without Translation, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 21 (1997). 
Professor Epstein's response to my critique turns on his speculation about what the 
"social sensibilities of 1791" would deem a taking, rather than examination of the 
original meaning of taken. See Richard A. Epstein, More Fidelity, Less Translation: A 
Loyalist's Response to Professor Treanor, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 185 (1998). In his classic 
work, Takings, Professor Epstein develops his concept of takings at great length. See 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 
34--104 (1985). But the basis of Epstein's analysis is, again, not textualist. His focus is 
on a conception of property: "For things reduced to ownership, the rules of property 
uniquely specify the rights of persons for all times. The rights so specified are internally 
consistent, so when all external things are claimed under a rule of first possession, each 
has one and only one owner." !d. at 85. Government action that denies the property 
owner the ability to use any of these rights is a taking. See, e.g.,- id. at I 02 (discussing 
why regulations are takings). Epstein's argument is based on a series of logical steps 
about when compensation should be due, rather than a discussion of what the word taken 
means. See generally id. at 34-104 (developing the concept of"takings prima facie"). 
12. See Wiliiam Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriousiy: Modern Textualism, 
Original Meaning, and the Case of A mar's Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REv. 487, 487 
(2007) (discussing rise oftextualism). 
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precisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not 
what the original draftsmen intended."13 Original meaning textualists read 
the Constitution in accordance with the public meaning of the 
constitutional text-not the meaning that ratifiers or drafters gave the 
words, but the meaning of the words to the general public-at the time 
of the text's adoption. 
In explaining the gap between textualism and other approaches to 
constitutional interpretation, Justice Scalia writes: 
My favorite example of a departure from text ... pertains to the Due Process 
Clause found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution .... By its inescapable terms, it guarantees only process. Property can 
be taken by the state; liberty can be taken; even life can be taken; but not 
without the process that our traditions require--notably, a validly enacted law 
and a fair trial. To say otherwise is to abandon textualism, and to render 
democratically adopted texts mere springboards for judiciallawmaking.14 
There is, however, another phrase in the Bill of Rights with respect to 
which the modem Court has departed from the obvious original meaning 
of the text, although neither Justice Scalia nor Justice Thomas would 
acknowledge this. That phrase is "the Takings Clause." 
Justice Scalia, along with Justice Thomas, has read the text of the 
Takings Clause to encompass regulations. In Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, Justice Scalia-joined by Justice Thomas and two 
other members of the Court-observed: 
[T]he text of the Clause can be read to encompass regulatory as well as physical 
deprivations (in contrast to the text originally proposed by Madison, see Speech 
Proposing Bill of Rights (June 8, 1789), in 12 J. Madison, The Papers of James 
Madison 201 (C. Hobson, R. Rutland, W. Rachal, & J. Sisson ed. 1979) ("No 
person shall be ... obliged to relinquish his proferty, where it may be necessary 
for public use, without a just compensation")). 1 
Thus, Justice Scalia reads relinquish as limited to physical deprivations, 
but taken as applying to regulations, as well as physical deprivations. 
Similarly, in arguing in the dissent in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, 
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency that a temporary moratorium on 
land development ran afoul of the Takings Clause, Justice Thomas-
joined by Justice Scalia-stated: "A taking is exactly what occurred in 
this case."16 
13. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 38 (1997). 
14. !d. at 24-25. 
15. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 n.15 (1992). 
16. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'! Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302, 355 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.). 
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Although leading original meaning textualists embrace the doctrine of 
regulatory takings with enthusiasm, regulatory takings is at least as much an 
oxymoron as substantive due process. 
Examination of the meaning of the word take at the time of the 
adoption of the Fifth Amendment and examination of the earlier ·history 
of the word shows that the word most commonly referred to physical 
acts. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) reports: 
The earliest known use of this verb in the Germanic languages was app. to 
express the physical action 'to put the hand on', 'to touch'-the only known 
sense of Gothic tekan. By a natural advance, such as is seen in English in the 
use of 'lay hands upon,' the sense passed to 'lay hold upon, lay hold of, grip, 
grasp, seize'-the essential meaning of Old Norse taka, of MDu. taken, and of 
the material senses of take in English. I? 
The OED lists the first definition of the word take as to touch, and 
traces this usage back to 1150.18 The second definition is: 
To lay hold upon, get into one's hands by force or artifice; to seize, capture, esp. 
in war; to make prisoner; hence, to get into one's power, to win by conquest (a 
fort, town, country). Also, to apprehend (a person charged with an offence), to 
arrest; to seize (property) by legal process, as by distraint, etc.l9 
This definition, which encompasses physically seizing property by force 
oflaw, is traced back to 1100.20 
A second legal usage is reflected in the fifteenth definition. This 
definition involves a physical act of possession--and the exercise of 
eminent domain reflects this meaning of take: "[t]o transfer by one's 
own direct act (a thing) into one's possession or keeping; to appropriate; 
to enter into possession or use of .... To take possession; spec. in Law, 
to enter into actual possession. "21 This legal usage is traced back to 
1642; for example: "There is one named in the Lease who may take 
immediately .'.22 
In dictionaries of the same era as the Fifth Amendment, the dominant 
meaning of take involves a physical act of control, most commonly a 
seizure or a reception of control of an object; none of the definitions 
provided in these dictionaries is consistent with the idea that regulation 
17. 17 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 557 (2d ed. 1989). 
18. /d. 
19. !d. at 558. 
20. !d. 
21. !d. at 559. 
22. !d. (quoting JOHN PERKINS, PROFITABLE BOOK II §52 (15th ed. 1827) (1642)). 
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of property is a taking. For example, in the fifth edition of Sheridan's 
dictionary, which was published in 1789, the same year Congress 
proposed the Fifth Amendment, to take is defined in the following way 
as an active verb: 
To receive what is offered; to seize what is not given; to receive; to receive with 
good or ill-will; to lay hold on, to catch by surprize [sic] or artifice; to make 
prisoner; to captivate with pleasure, to delight; to understand in any particular 
sense or manner; to use; to employ; to admit any thing had from without; to tum 
to, to practice; to close in with, to comply with; to catch in the hand, to seize; to 
receive into the mind; to swallow as a medicine; to choose one of more; to 
copy; to convey, to carry; to fasten on, to seize, not to refuse, to accept; to 
endure, to bear; to assume, to allow3 to admit; to hire, to rent; to use as an oath or expression; to seize as a disease.2 
The dictionary defines to take in the following way as a neutral verb: "to 
direct the course; to have a tendency to; to gain reception; to have the 
intended or natural effect; to catch, to fix."24 In the sixth edition, to take 
is defined as "to catch in the hand; to seize; to receive into the mind; ... 
to admit" and "to gain reception; ... to catch; to fix."25 The American 
edition of the Perry's Royal Standard English Dictionary published in 
1788 states that take meant "to hire; receive; fix; seize; to suppose; 
please; to gain reception."26 The Columbian Dictionary in 1800 defines 
take as "to receive, to seize, ... to please, to gain reception."27 Kersey's 
dictionary, in both its 1713 and 1772 editions, defined to take as "to hold 
with one's hand, to lay hold of."28 
Like today, in the late eighteenth century there were usages of take 
that did not involve physical seizure. For example, the Oxford English 
Dictionary reports a 1780 usage of the phrase to take a joke, which the 
dictionary defines as "to be able to bear teasing or amusement at one's 
expense; usu. in negative."29 The OED also finds from this era usages of 
23. THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th 
ed. 1789). 
24. !d. 
25. THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th 
ed. 1796). 
26. WILLIAM PERRY, THE ROYAL STANDARD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 499 (1st Am. 
ed. 1788). 
27. CALEB ALEXANDER, THE COLUMBIAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
472 (1800). 
28. JOHN KERSEY, A NEW ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1713); JOHN KERSEY, A 
NEW ENGLISH DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1772). John Elliot and Samuel Johnson's dictionary 
did not have a definition ofthe word take. See JOHN ELLIOTT & SAMUEL JOHNSON, JR., A 
SELECTED, PRONOUNCING AND ACCENTED DICTIONARY 204 ( 1800). 
29. 17 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 563 (2d ed. 1989). The quoted example 
from 1780 was "Poor Sam cant [sic] take a Joke." !d. (quoting J. WOODFORDE, DIARY 
(28 Mar. 1780)). 
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take meaning "[t]o receive and hold with the intellect."30 But in 
reviewing late eighteenth century dictionaries and the Oxford English 
Dictionary, I have not found a usage of take consistent with diminution 
of a right. Therefore, if one is committed to interpreting constitutional 
text in accordance with usage at the time of adoption, one should reject 
the doctrine of regulatory takings. As a textual matter, for the founding 
generation, a government regulation that diminished the value of 
property did not take that property. Original meaning textualists should 
thus view the doctrine of regulatory takings as they view the doctrine of 
substantive due process, which is to say that they should regard it as an 
obvious example of courts gone astray. 
Originalists-if they look at background evidence beyond the 
meaning of the adopted text itself--wind up in the same place. 31 
Although the debate about the competing methodologies of textualism 
and originalism is a heated one/2 the fact that the originalist evidence 
supports my reading of the text is helpful: it reinforces the notion that 
my reading of the text tracks the way in which the text would have been 
understood at the time of the Fifth Amendment's adoption. Indeed, I use 
originalist evidence here as Justice Scalia would use it: to "display how 
the text of the Constitution was originally understood."33 
The two pre-revolutionary precursors of the Takings Clause both use 
variants on the word take in contexts where the word clearly refers to physical 
seizure of things. The Magna Carta bars crown officials from "tak[in§} 
com or other chattels of any man without immediate payment . . . . " 
The 1641 Massachusetts Body of Liberties provides that "[n]o man[']s 
Cattel or goods of what kinde soever [sic] shall be pressed or taken 
for any publique use or service" without payment.35 Consistent with the 
30. !d. The example from 173 7 was "The Reader will easily take the Meaning." 
!d. (quoting BRACKEN, II FARRIERY lMPR. 278 (1737)). 
31. My argument here is a brief summary of my argument in The Original 
Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process. Treanor, supra note 4, 
at 782-84. My argument has not convinced everyone. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Takings, 
Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1549, 1573-74 (2003). 
32. See Treanor, supra note 12. 
33. SCALIA, supra note 13, at 38 (discussing The Federalist's relevance to textual 
interpretation). 
34. Magna Carta, ch. 28 (1215), reprinted in A.E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: 
TEXT ANDCOMMENTARY43 (rev. ed. 1998). 
35. Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641, § 8, reprinted in WILLIAM H. 
WHITMORE, A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE LAWS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS COLONY 
FROM 1630 TO 1686, at 34--35 (Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 2006) (1641). 
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dictionaries quoted above, the word take refers to a physical act of 
control. 
The three revolutionary era constitutional documents that had takings 
clauses seem to have been a product of concern about physical takings. 
The first takings clause in the revolutionary era was in the Vermont 
Constitution of 1777, and like the Fifth Amendment, employs taken: 
"That private property ought to be subservient to public uses, when 
necessity requires it; nevertheless, whenever any particular man's 
property is taken for the use of the public, the owner ought to receive an 
equivalent in money."36 The clause was the product of Vermont's 
breaking away from New York after the New York government had 
rejected the New Hampshire land claims where most of the property in 
the area that ultimately became Vermont rested; thus, the Vermont 
framers' concern was with the physical loss of their land. 37 The 
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 used the language of appropriation--
. "[W]henever the public exigencies require, that the property of any 
individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a 
reasonable compensation therefor"38-which also reflects the idea of 
government physically controlling property, rather than regulating it. To 
the extent that one can deduce why Massachusetts adopted this clause, 
the evidence suggests that it reflected a concern with impressment of 
goods by the military.39 Similarly, the language of the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787-"[S]hould the public exigencies make it necessary, 
for the common preservation, to take any person's property, or to 
demand his particular services, full compensation shall be made for the 
same"
40
---suggests a concern with impressment, and was so interpreted 
by an early court.41 In sum, historical context indicates that the three 
revolutionary era constitutional documents that had takings clauses were 
the product of concerns about acts of physical takings. The use of the 
word take in two of the documents, like the use of the word 
appropriated in the third, accords with the concern that gave rise to the 
need for constitutional protection. Take denotes a physical act. 
The Takings Clause has virtually no drafting or ratification history 
relevant to understanding the Clause's meaning. It is the only Clause in 
the Bill of Rights not sought by any state during the constitutional 
ratification process. Madison did not explain its meaning when he proposed 
36. VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 2 (1777). 
37. See Treanor, supra note 4, at 827-30. 
38. MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. 1, art. X, reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 342 (1971 ). 
39. See Treanor, supra note 4, at 830-32. 
40. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, ch. 8, art. II, 1 Stat. 50, 52 n.(a) (1789). 
41. Renthorp v. Bourg, 4 Mart. (o.s.) 97, 132 (La. 1816). 
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the Bill of Rights in the House of Representatives, and there is no 
discussion of the Clause's meaning in the record of the debates over the 
Bill of Rights. As Justice Scalia noted in Lucas, the language of the 
Clause was modified in Congress.42 But there is no record of why the 
shift from Madison's phrase, "No person shall be ... obliged to relinquish 
his property, where it may be necessary for public use, without a just 
compensation," to "nor shall private property be taken for public use 
without just compensation" occurred. As argued above, the word taken 
when linked with property reflected physical control, so--contrary to 
Justice Scalia's claim-the shift did not lead to a text that encompassed 
government regulations. I suspect that the wording change simply reflected 
an effort to bring the Clause more in line with its precursors, all of 
which-with the exception of the Massachusetts Constitution-employed 
the word take or a variant. 
The other relevant contemporaneous evidence on the meaning of taken 
in the Takings Clause is Madison's 1792 essay On Property, in which he 
used the Takings Clause as a basis for critiquing Hamilton's economic 
policies of preferential taxation to support manufacturing and grants of 
monopolies. Madison wrote: 
If there be a government then which prides itself in maintaining the inviolability 
of property; which provides that none shall be taken directly even for public use 
without indemnification to the owner, and yet directly violates the property 
which individuals have in their opinions, their religion, their persons, and their 
faculties; nay more, which indirectly violates their property, in their actual 
possessions, in the labor that acquires their daily subsistence, and in the 
hallowed remnant of time which ought to relieve their fatigues and soothe their 
cares, the influence will have been anticipated, that such a government is not a 
pattern for the United States.43 
Although this paragraph does not precisely spell out Madison's 
understanding of the Takings Clause, what is noteworthy is that the word 
taken is the key to his analysis of what the Takings Clause covers, as 
opposed to the broader principles for which it stands. He outlines three 
types of interferences with property: when real property is directly taken, 
when there are other direct violations of property rights, and when there 
are indirect violations of property rights. Thus, as Madison read the 
42. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 n.l5 (1992). 
43. James Madison, Property, NAT'L GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 14 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266, 267-68 (Robert A. Rutland eta!. eds., 1983). 
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Clause as it was adopted, it covered only a limited subset of property 
rights, a view consistent with the textual analysis above.44 
The dominant approach in antebellum case law was consistent with 
the textual reading that I have offered here.45 As one treatise writer 
observed in 1857: "It seems to be settled that, to entitle the owner to 
protection under this clause, the property must be actually taken in the 
physical sense of the word .... "46 When in the late nineteenth century, 
John Lewis, in his influential treatise on eminent domain law, argued 
that the takings doctrine should afford protection "beyond the mere 
corporeal object" and protect property conceived of as a "bundle of 
rights," he noted that his view was at odds with the early case law.47 He 
acknowledged that the early case law had not adopted this capacious 
view of the takings doctrine, and, significantly, he argued that the cause 
of the flawed approach in the early case law was that "[t]hese early cases 
attacked the question wrong end first, so to speak, through the word 
taken instead of through the word property. "48 As this quote from Lewis 
perfectly illustrates, modem regulatory takings doctrine emerged when 
courts began to overlook the significance of the word taken in the 
Takings Clause. 
To conclude, at the time of the founding, the relevant dictionary 
definitions of taken concerned physical seizing or gaining physical 
control; the predecessor clauses to the Federal Takings Clause were also 
44. For further discussion, see Treanor, supra note 4, at 838-39. Madison's other 
primary discussion of the Takings Clause was in an 1819 letter indicating that the Clause 
mandated compensation to slave owners if slavery were abolished. See id. at 839. This 
letter indicates that for Madison, slaves were property within the meaning of the Takings 
Clause, and compensation was owed even when the slaves were freed. This is consistent 
with what appears to have been the consensus view concerning abolition and compensation in 
the early republic, see id. at 839 n.292, and bears on what the term public use meant for 
the founding generation. 
45. See id. at 792-94. See also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW, 1780--1860, at 71-74 (1977) (discussing early case law and consequential 
damages doctrine). 
46. THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE 
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 519 (New 
York, JohnS. Voorhies 1857). One exception to the principle stated by Sedgwick is that 
a number of judges, beginning in the 1830s, found revocation of franchises to be 
compensable takings. See Treanor, supra note 4, at 792 n.56. This does not, 
however, challenge my textualist argument. Rather, it shows that, even in the nineteenth 
century, not all judges were textualists. For further discussion of nontextual approaches 
to constitutional interpretation in the early republic, see William Michael Treanor, 
Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REv. 455 (2005) (discussing prevalence of 
nontextual approach to constitutional review in certain circumstances at the time of the 
founding). 
47. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870--
1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 147 (1992) (quoting JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE 
ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES41, 43 (1888)). 
48. !d. 
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concerned with physical takings, which further supports the equation of 
taken with physical control; Madison's primary writing on the Clause 
evidences a narrow reading of the clause, as does the early case law. 
Justices Scalia and Thomas have championed expansive readings of the 
Takings Clause, but for a committed textualist, regulatory takings, like 
substantive due process, is an oxymoron. 
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